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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statement of Issues 
1. Whether the district court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, Volvo 
was not able to trace $693,132 in funds in which it claimed a security interest because an 
exception to the neutral lowest intermediale balance tracing rules would not be created 
and applied in this case for the $900,000 transferred to Wells Fargo where Wells Fargo 
was an innocent third party transferee?1 
2. Does Section 70A-9a-332 of Revised Article 92 of Utah's Uniform 
Commercial Code apply to the transactions at issue, thereby barring Volvo's claims 
against Wells Fargo? 
3. If Revised Article 9 does not apply, are Volvo's claims against Wells Fargo 
barred under the "ordinary course" defense set forth in Section 70A-9-306(2) and Official 
Comment 2(c) thereto of pre-Revised Article 9 of Utah's Uniform Commercial Code? 
1
 If this Court agrees with the district court s legal ruling, there is no need for further 
analysis. Otherwise, issues 2 and 3 will need to be decided in this appeal. 
~ Revised Article 9 of Utah's UCC was enacted by the Utah Legislature in 2000. As part 
of the revisions to Article 9, transition rules were enacted which set the effective date for 
the revisions as July 1, 2001, see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-701, but also provided that 
''except as otherwise provided m this part, this act applies to a transaction or lien within 
its scope, even if the transaction or lien was entered into or created before this act takes 
effect." See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-702(l). 
1 
Standard of Review: Because the district court decided the issue on summary 
judgment, the standard of review is de novo. Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass'n, 922 P.2d 
8 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
I. Former Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2) (pre-Revised Article 9) provided: 
(2) Except where this chapter or Chapter 2a, Leases, otherwise 
provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, 
exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was 
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and 
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received 
by the debtor. 
Official Comment 2(c) to pre-Revised § 70A-9-306(2) provides: 
(c) Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking 
account and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of 
the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may 
have in them as proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and 
transfers in ordinary course. The law of fraudulent conveyances would no 
doubt in appropriate cases support recovery of proceeds by a secured party 
from a transferee out of ordinary course or otherwise in collusion with the 
debtor to defraud the secured party. 
II. Former Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3) (pre-Revised Article 9) provided: 
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected 
security interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it 
ceases to be a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days 
after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless: 
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral 
and the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or 
III. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-332 provides: 
(2) A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free 
of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in 
collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party. 
IV. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-702(l) provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this part, this act applies to a 
transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien was 
entered into or created before this act takes effect. 
V. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l) provides: 
(1) This act determines the priority of conflicting claims to 
collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established 
before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines priority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Volvo Commercial Finance LLC The Americas ("Volvo") seeks damages of 
$693,000 from Wells Fargo Bank ("Wells Fargo") relating to monies transferred by 
Volvo's debtor, Great Basin, to Wells Fargo to cover checks Great Basin had written on 
its Wells Fargo accounts to pay business expenses. Wells Fargo received no notice of 
any kind from Volvo, and had no knowledge that the transfer violated Volvo's security 
interest. Rather, Great Basin simply made the transfer to cover its checks as it had 
promised Wells Fargo. Under these circumstances involving two innocent parties, 
Volvo's claims were properly dismissed under the governing tracing rules. Alternatively, 
Volvo's claims are barred under applicable Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") statutes. 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Volvo financed the purchase of Volvo 
vehicles by some of the Great Basin tmck dealerships and took a security interest in those 
trucks. In the fall of 2000, the Great Basin tmck dealerships began to experience 
3 
financial difficulties and got behind in sending truck sales proceeds to Volvo. In late 
December 2000, some potential overdrafts appeared in a Great Basin concentration 
account at Wells Fargo. In response to a call from Wells Fargo, Great Basin promised, 
and then wire-transferred $900,000 into the concentration account on December 29, 
2000, to cover the potential $830,000 in overdrafts. Those potential overdrafts related to 
checks that had been written in the regular course of Great Basin's business, including 
nearly $500,000 in checks to Volvo Trucks of North America, Inc. ("Volvo Trucks"). 
Volvo now seeks damages of $693,000 from Wells Fargo for the monies transferred by 
Great Basin to cover the checks based on an asserted exception or alteration to the 
universally accepted and neutral lowest intermediate balance rules of tracing ("LIBR"). 
However, on the undisputed facts there is no legal or factual basis for such a departure 
from LIBR. And, in any event, under applicable UCC provisions Wells Fargo received 
the transferred funds free of Volvo's security interest. 
Course of Proceedings 
On June 13, 2002, Volvo filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo alleging that 
$693,000 of $900,000 that was transferred by Great Basin into a concentration account 
on December 29, 2000, to cover its business checks, constituted traceable proceeds from 
the sale of 53 vehicles in which Volvo claimed a security interest. Wells Fargo filed an 
amended answer denying liability and asserting several affirmative defenses."3 
J
 Because die district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, Wells 
Fargo's affirmative defenses have never been addressed. 
4 
Volvo moved for partial summary judgment solely on the issue of Wells Fargo's 
liability on the conversion claim but not on damages. R. 761-63. Wells Fargo filed a 
motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of all claims. R. 813-15. On 
November 11, 2004, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision denying Volvo's 
motion and granting Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, R. 2210-15, and 
entered Judgment dismissing all claims against Wells Fargo with prejudice. R. 2216-25. 
On December 7, 2005, Volvo filed its notice of appeal. R. 2226-28. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Organization and Financing of the Great Basin Entities, 
Great Basin Company, Inc. was the parent company of several dealership and 
service subsidiaries engaged in the business of selling and servicing GMC, Volvo, Mack, 
Great Dane, East and Dyna-Weld trucks and trailers (the entities shall collectively be 
referred to as "Great Basin" or the "Great Basin Entities"). R. 1278. The Great Basin 
dealerships in Salt Lake, Arizona, Albuquerque, and Idaho obtained floor plan financing 
from Volvo, secured by all new and used trucks, motor vehicles, tractors, trailers and 
similar equipment of the foregoing entities (the uVolvo Floor Plan Agreements"). 
R. 857, 861, 946, 948-71. Other Great Basin dealerships obtained floor plan financing 
from Associates Commercial Corporation ("Associates") secured by all new and used 
trucks and trailers. R. 1143, 1147-58. Most of the Great Basin Entities were also 
obligated on an operating line of credit with Zions First National Bank, N.A. ("Zions 
Bank") secured by a borrowing base comprised of various assets of the obligors on the 
line of credit. R. 1078-79, 1143, 1160-64. 
<N 
C r e a t Basin's Cash Management System, 
•.;^  ^ m e n t system at Wells Fargo in 1998 through treasury management accounts (the 
"Treasury Management Accounts") for each of the separate Great Basin Entities, and a 
concentration account irjemiir^i .L, ac, v ,1*N ^ > ^ " " ' ••': * 1 
\ \ n mill 'in r "l( ' I "i 11 I'I I MC tit day the operating funds generated by the Great Basin 
Entities were deposited into each individual entity's Treasury Management Account, and 
then funds in the Treasury Management Accounts were swept into the Concenti atic ai 
, U X u l l I l l i II )«Ki ' > • Il I M i 
As part of the cash management system, a Controlled Disbursement Account was 
also set up out of which paym.en.ts to third parties could, and generally were made by the 
Great Basin ktiiifies " I «'" 'lit" t Merit l ie <" iival Basin Pndfifr, ninVH l<» mal-r i paytncit 
•isiness operations or taxes, they did so from either the Controlled Disbursement 
Account or the individual Treasury Management Accounts and sufficient funds were 
transferred into those accounts lrom the ( oiiecnliaiimi it< utmi su (li.il ilk pa\ nicnts 
i •< n ii 11 >e iTic K ie R 996 97 1.019, 1283. 
Gi eat Bas in ' s Financial Difficulties and Notices of its Default. 
Certain (.Jreal Basin tannics began to experience - n.-.iu-.. . .. 
2ui. •; ,*j i.-i.:. . ,,•,, ,.< - - : ,v,n »«/lenders, including Volvo. R. 1039-
4
 The checks for the Controlled Disbursement Account contaiiI a specific reference on the 
top of the check stating to "Wachovia Bank, N.A. Greensville, South Carolina In 
Cooperation with & Payable if Desire at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." 'Therefore. Volvo 
cannot claim it was not aware of Great Basin's banking relationship with Wells Famo. 
R. 2126-40. 
40. In early September 2000, Volvo concluded that payments of the floor plan amounts 
owed to Volvo were being delayed by Great Basin contrary to the terms of the Volvo 
Floor Plan Agreements. R. 1039-40. Over the next few months, Volvo conducted 
several audits of the pertinent Great Basin Entities, which, according to Volvo, "revealed 
that the Dealerships . . . intentionally and deliberately [withheld] payment from Volvo on 
sold vehicles." R. 1031-34, 1045-51, 1062-64. 
On December 8, 2000, Volvo sent out a notice of default to the pertinent Great 
Basin Entities stating that they must pay ail the sums due and owing to Volvo in full by 
December 18, 2000. R. 1034-35, 1051-52. On December 20, 2000, Volvo notified the 
pertinent Great Basin Entities in writing that because the event of default was not cured, 
Volvo was suspending the lines of credit under the Volvo Floor Plan Agreements. 
R. 1036, 1053-55. On December 21 and 22, 2000, Volvo sent written notices to account 
debtors of the Great Basin Entities who had purchased Volvo vehicles directing them to 
pay all funds owed to the Great Basin Entities directly to Volvo. R. 1036, 1056-58. In 
addition, on December 22, 2000, Volvo sent a written notice to Zions Bank directing it 
"to segregate any proceeds of the sale of our inventory that come into any dealerships' 
account(s) at Zions, to hold the funds as constructive trustee for the benefit of Volvo 
Finance, and to forward the proceeds directly to [Volvo] " R. 1080-81, 1084-85. 
However, no such notice was sent to Wells Fargo. Indeed, at no time did Volvo 
even notify Wells Fargo that Great Basin was in default under the Volvo Floor Plan 
Agreements, or make a demand on Wells Fargo that it turn over to or hold for Volvo's 
7 
benefit any of the proceeds received by Great Basin from the sale ol \ *-h < > \ Uncles mat 
were deposited ,;.;,; UIL ,\CC;- • . ^'ss-s(),' 
I 'he Concen.11 ation i \ccount Transactions. 
On December 21 and 22, 2001), Great Basin caused $1,500,000 and $500,000, 
respectively, to be transferred from tin; i oneentration Acco . • -• --\<\ Si\ .* ' • 
\ . • . i •, ' - " :i;; motions of dollars were made hv Great 
Basin into and out of the Concentration Account in the month of December. R 1236-42. 
On the morning of Decern hei 2". JOuO, representatives ol .\ .;.., L argo recci\. i 
the Dail)/ Management O 'erdraft •*• •• s Vcks from the 
Controlled Disbursement Account or the Treasury Management Accounts presented for 
payment against the Concentration Account on December 26, 2000 were processed ^wd 
honored, then the Conceniralinn Av\ mini * milil be n w n l u ^ i i lln 'liiioiinf mf 
$281,0^6,01 I1' u i , i I<J9- l i . in accordance with company policy and its prior 
practice with Great Basin, Wells Fargo that same morning contacted Mary Sheets, the 
appropriate representative at Great Basin, to iniorni her i >l iht* slfilus ol (In I on* entr.ilion 
/ . x *-heN ^im. i! -} » : s:,!t ! Jasin would cover the overdraft by making a 
$300,000 wire transfer offunds into the Concentration Accnunt. R. 000, 1 0 U ^ i i i u 
02. Based on Great Basin's oral proline, 'A eii> i-urgo perm.u^u -I:J : IA>.> . 
an • ua :^.v . . . . . : , , ... , : M - - •• , .iP;eB R . 999? j j(jj. 
In its factual statement, Volvo references its settlement A uh / ions Bank and suggests 
Wells Fargo should have followed suit (Applt's Brief at 10), but Volvo fails to note the 
crucial distinction that it gave notice to Zions Bank that it claimed a secuntv interest m 
proceeds from Great Basin's sale of Volvo trucks. It is undisputed that Volvo gave no 
such notice to Wells Fargo. 
Great Basin then, as promised, caused $300,000 to be wire transferred from the First 
Security Account into the Concentration Account on December 27, 2000. R. 1000, 1012. 
On the morning of December 28, 2000, Wells Fargo representatives received the 
Daily Overdraft Management Report indicating that if all the checks from the Controlled 
Disbursement Account or the Treasury Management Accounts presented for payment 
against the Concentration Account on December 27, 2000, were processed and honored, 
then the Concentration Account would be overdrawn in the amount of $790,160.73. R. 
1000-01, 1104, 1113-14. That same morning Wells Fargo again contacted Mary Sheets 
at Great Basin to inform her of the status of the Concentration Account, and she 
responded that Great Basin would cover the overdraft by making a wire transfer of funds 
into the Concentration Account. R. 1104. Based on Great Basin's oral promise, Wells 
Fargo permitted the checks that would cause the $790,160.73 overdraft to be processed in 
the normal course. R. 1104-05. As discussed below, Great Basin made that wire 
transfer into the Concentration Account on the following day, December 29, 2000. 
On the morning of December 29, 2000, representatives of Wells Fargo received 
the Daily Overdraft Management Report which indicated that another approximately 
$39,000 in checks from the Controlled Disbursement Account or the Treasury 
Management Accounts had been presented against the Concentration Account on 
December 28, 2000, and if those checks were processed and honored, then the 
Concentration Account would be overdrawn in the total amount of $828,951.36. R. 
1001-02, 1105, 1116-18. Significantly, the potential $828,951.36 overdraft was caused 
0 
in substantial part by multiple checks totaling b4V»; V) pa\ aoK uer 
compan) ', V ob - • : •• I "i i lcks R 1 218 19 
On December 29, 2000, Wells Fargo's representative again contacted Mary Sheets 
that morning to inform her of the statiis of the Concentration Account. Sheets responded 
by sUung mat < . .i IVI , < i r ' r r ' - ' - . , . > * ' ' A f : \ -
< -S f- i* no the Concentration Account to cover the overdraft of December 28th plus the 
additional $39,000, R. 1105-06, 1116-18. Based on Great Basin's oral promise, Wells 
Fargo permitted the approximately >.r* - . . .- =* : : 
$328,051 36 to be processed in the normal course. R. 1001-02, 1106. As promised, on. 
December 29, 2000, Great Basin caused $900,000 to be wire transferred from, an account 
at First Security Bank (the "TnM >eeuiiiv .XLCOUHI MI;.* J,^ wOncentnuo:, . v.. .;.. i 
ccn ' :: i the checks • M !• • - -u - ••-, Great Ba^m 
Entities were experiencing financial difficulties at the time Great Basin made the wire 
transfers into the Concentration Account on December 2 ( \ 200* -; • • - . 
Great Basin's Bankruptcy Filing and. ""Volvo s ('oni(i II, iiiiiimiiiIII 
On January 5, 2001, some of the Great Basin Entities filed for bankruptcy in Utah. 
R. ;43, 1187, \ in June 13, 2002, Volvo filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo asserting 
causes ci acuoi. ;or conversion, I n yi ist erii ichii lei it. and ::oi isti t ictiv e ti i ist prei i lised c i I the 
alleuati' < ' ,i • .•>' H • . • • HJ ,000 that was transferred by Great Basin into a 
6
 Volvo does not contend that the disbursements made on December 28th and 29th were 
other than for the puipose of paying Great Basin's regular business expenses presumably 
because more than half of the disbursements that contributed to the total overdraft on 
December 29, 2000 were made to Volvo Tn lcks. 
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Concentration Account on December 29, 2000, constituted traceable proceeds from the 
sale of the 53 vehicles in which Volvo claimed a security interest. R. 1-15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Because Volvo's claims depend on being able to trace truck sales proceeds to the 
$900,000 wire transfer made by Great Basin on December 29, 2000, the analysis in this 
case begins with the determination of the applicable tracing rules. The law in Utah and 
elsewhere follows the lowest intermediate balance rule ("LIBR") as the proper tracing 
method. There is no dispute that if the LIBR rules are followed in this case, no traceable 
truck sales proceeds in which Volvo held a security interest were in the Concentration 
Account on the critical date of December 29, 2000, and Volvo's claims fail. 
The first rule of tracing under LIBFL's is that where there are commingled funds in 
an account, it is presumed that non-trust funds are removed before trust funds. Because 
the Concentration Account had a negative balance on December 27, 2000, under LIBR 
all the proceeds from the sale of Volvo's collateral had been dissipated from the 
Concentration Account by that date and thus, there were no truck sales proceeds Volvo 
could trace. In addition, the second rule of tracing under LIBR holds that new deposits 
generally do not replenish trust funds. Under that rule, the $900,000 wire transfer made 
from the First Security Account into the Concentration Account on December 29, 2000, 
7
 The tracing analysis prepared by Derk Rasmussen (a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum Ex. A), Wells Fargo's accounting expert, which applies the LIBR rules 
strictly and neutrally to all the transfers in the Concentration Account in December, 2000, 
shows that no proceeds from the sale of Volvo trucks could have been included in the 
$900,000 wire transfer on December 29, 2000. 
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could not have replenished any proceeds ii. AIHUI \,,I\, . u j a ^ i ^ i :::ic;c- :UM 
have prev lously existed in the Concentratioi :i A. ccoi in It 
There are no disputed facts relating to the tracing issue and Volvo does not dispute 
the applicability of LIBR in this tracing situation. Rathei. V d \ o s enure argument is 
based on its clan i 1 that thei e should be a depar f:i n e fi om I JBF i i lies whei e tliei e is a 
s
 - * 1 •= * H : -i Jebtor's accounts and the transfer is not made for the purpose of being 
dissipated to a third party. In support of this argument, Volvo relies principally on three 
century-old cases that were 3,. iccidea i j Dciou L... ^ " ^ 
ri;i 111 w hirh eoninnTn * • -r^ni.- Applying Volvo's exception 
in the modem commercial world would impose impractical burdens on the system. 
Accordingly, the modern UCC cases do not suppoii \ 0^ .Vs argued departure . . sn 
LLBK's itilles, i vliuivuvn, lu flu1 o ln i t \ >l 1 1 1 nilimv HM I\,r»r^ havr ; 1 n\' conlinuini1 
validity in the modem UCC context, they have no application here because they turn 
either on the wrongdoing of the defendant or on the fact that the funds, in some form,, 
were still in the 1 lands of the ti 1 istee, 1 e ,, the eq til v alent to Gi ea t Basin 1 lei e • Neither 
situ rn^r -cK.ts in this case. Additionally, the exception advocated by Volvo is 
inapplicable in any event because the $900,000 transfer on December 29, 2000, was 
made by Great Basin to cover check :. :ni..;nc- •> ..s: »«:- *• •»»• I 
f » i r ' : -*\ \y<y> ''•- <\r:\^u- 1 *•> :>;nuire fron1 LIBR's neutral tracing rules would 
be particularly unfair in this case where Volvo seeks to recover funds from Wells Fargo 
that were paid to Volvo Trucks. 
1? 
Because the district court followed LIBR's rules in granting summary judgment, it 
did not need to reach Wells Fargo's additional arguments. However, if Volvo could trace 
its proceeds into the $900,000 transfer, either Revised Article 9, adopted in 2000, or pre-
Revised Article 9 precludes Volvo's claim. Section 70A-9a-332 of Revised Article 9 
states that "a transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds "free" of a 
security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in collusion with the 
debtor in violating the rights of the secured party." There is no allegation by Volvo that 
Wells Fargo colluded with Great Basin to harm Volvo or deprive it of its collateral in this 
case. As such, Wells Fargo, as an innocent transferee, took the $900,000 in wired funds 
free of any security interest Volvo had in those funds. 
Even if, as Volvo contends, pre-Revised Article 9 applies in this case, Section 
70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) thereto also provide Wells Fargo an absolute 
defense to Volvo's claims because that section protects transferees who receive money in 
the ordinary course. Wells Fargo was clearly an ordinary course recipient of the funds 
that were transferred by Great Basin. Wells Fargo and Great Basin had a long standing 
banking relationship and Great Basin was merely taking the necessary and customary 
action to pay its regular business expenses as evidenced by the fact that the overdrafts 
included the $494,493.77 in checks payable to Volvo Trucks. 
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POINT 1 
UNDER IT1E C'ON I( U\\i\ i""i I i n \ LS I liNTERMEDI 4. I E 
li/ GLANCE TRACING RULE, VUL\ O L ANNO I TRACE AN Y PROCEEDS 
FROM THE SALE OF ITS COLLATERAL TO 
THE $900,000 WIRE TRANSFER ON DECEMBER 29, 2000 
~"
 e
 Lowest Intermediate Balance Tracing Rule. 
{ i.aci Li :•• . . a paily seek.. llu irhirn ul Ms hunk that In n \ hern deposited 
r-i*v- iulc\1 bank account, then that party must be able to trace its funds. See 
Sisman v. Ogden State Bank (In re Ogden State Bank), 94 Utah 61, 75 P.2d 3 T*. ?17 
(Utah 1938). In Sisman, tlii i ;.ui i-^pu me V oun -^nc - -..uikgreqi lirements 
• tppln ablr !<>.*••* . » • j that the burden of tracing rests on the claimant: 
"It is indispensable to the maintenance by the cestui que trust.,. "that clear 
proof be made that the trust property or its proceeds went into a specific 
d or into a specific identical piece of property which came into the hands 
"• the receiver, and then the claim can be sustained to that fimd or property 
• 'M • v, and only to the extent that the trust property or its proceeds went into 
It is not sufficient to prove that the trust property or its proceeds went 
iiiio the general assets of the insolvent estate and increased the amount and 
value thereof which came into the hands of the receiver. The burden of 
tracing the trust fund into the assets of the bank in the hands of the receiver, 
or of identifying it in his hands, rests upon the cestui que trust or claimant/' 
hi >>«!.i;j iii M ,.i.juivuitiwiiv)i i'.iiaiiciai insiiiuiiuns <J N5U) (emphasis added).' 
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court in Kent v. Kent, 50 Utah 44, 165 P. 271 (I Jtah 
1917), also stated that the Must claimant's rights fail if it cannot trace its trust funds: 
When trust money becomes so mixed up with the trustee's individual funds 
that it is impossible to trace and identify it as entering into some specific 
property, the trust ceases. The court will go as far as it can in thus tracing 
and following trust money; but when, as a matter of fact, it cannot be 
traced, the equitable right of the cestui que Must \o toilou :i U\w>. 
Id. at 272 (quotingLittle v. Chadwick, o l Mass. 109. 23N.E. ]<H)5 ( 1S(>(T». 
1 A 
Although pre-Revised Article 9 is silent on the appropriate way to "identify" cash 
proceeds that have been commingled with other funds in the debtor's general bank 
account, the courts have permitted a secured party to assert a perfected security interest in 
any cash proceeds remaining in a general bank account under the LIBR method of 
tracing. See Tooele County Board of Education v. Hadlock, 79 Utah 478, 11 P.2d 320, 
324-25 (Utah 1932) (explains how the "lowest intermediate balance" rule applies in these 
situations and follows a "group of cases [that] holds that trust money must be traced into 
a specific fund in the receiver's hands . . ."). 
The Utah bankruptcy court in In re JD Services, Inc., 284 B.R. 292, 298 (Bankr. 
Utah 2002), explained the LIBR rules as follows: 
Under the lowest intermediate balance rule, any funds removed from 
a commingled account are presumed to be the Debtor's funds to the extent 
the funds exceed the beneficiary's equitable interest. If the Trustee deposits 
other funds into the commingled account, it is generally held that the 
Trustee is not replenishing trust funds. New deposits are not subject to the 
equitable claim of the trust beneficiary and subsequent withdrawals are 
presumed to draw first upon the new funds. Applying the rule, a 
constructive trust beneficiary may retrieve the lowest balance recorded after 
the funds were commingled. [Citation omitted]. 
The United States Supreme Court in Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1914), 
also made it clear that when a commingled fluid is dissipated, the trust fund is also 
dissipated. See also Turley v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 817 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(the lowest intermediate balance rule is applied to tracing, and if the fund is dissipated, 
subsequent deposits into a commingled bank account do not replenish the trust funds.) 
The accepted application of LIBR thus involves two rules. First, when 
withdrawals are made from a commingled general bank account, such withdrawals are 
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deemed to have first come from non-proceeds iuiuL. aiui oi.iv alter iiiu.^ c KIIKL. .a J :. 
Second, once the proceeds are removed from the account, they are presumed not to be 
replenished by subsequent deposits. In re JD Services, Inc. 284 R.R.
 ca 29X. Applying 
these rules, ii LIK omanc •: . i .im-'. *'• • <n •••.-• r.:«r ; i !-•< 
n wis that have been deposited into the commingled general bank 
account, the secured party cannot recover more than the lowest balance in the account 
even though subsequent deposits increase the uaiaaec a VAC e^mimii^iv.'J , C 
Vnhiulnr-, iinl Jupnli' lli.il Ihr I ' *!' • s r-.- tl~ • rr^ner tracing method under 
Utah law. Nor does Volvo dispute that if LIBR's \\\ •> rules are followed, it cannot trace 
any of its proceeds into the $900,000 transki into Vac l Concentration /•. ^ <»:u -earner, 
v i -tiuur-1 .1 i uiiii ciiH'ii! i, xcepdnm rs, nan *" ,:! * 
does not '-rp'y to all transfers but only to transfers that are "dissipated." Applt's Brief .u 
26. Tn other words, Volvo argues for an exception to LIP>R. that when "a trustee or a, "tor 
does not dissipate funds w ithdr a vv n from a :: :»i i imingled accoi int. 1: ii I 1: n istead maintaii is 
possession of the funds or their product (in cash, in another account, or other assets), the 
withdrawal does not defeat the beneficiary's or creditor's interest." Id. at 26-27. 
Howrever, this theory im:* a:-, a inatiei i-i ,>o\ hccai; i a- u. •.-. • \ \\ h a* 
exci !-!>« - •- i<- : - - : -\ "i^fpnv .:• \ because as a matter of fact, all the funds were 
dissipated. 
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B. Volvo's Proposed Exception to LIBR' First Rule Should be Rejected. 
Volvo's accounting expert, David Judd, prepared a tracing analysis of the 
proceeds from Great Basin's December 2000 sale of Volvo vehicles in which Volvo 
asserts a security interest. Mr. Judd concluded that $693,132 of the $900,000 that was 
wire transferred into the Concentration Account on December 29, 2000 can be traced to 
the sale of 53 Volvo vehicles in which Volvo held a security interest. In doing so, 
Mr. Judd acknowledged that LIBR is the proper method of tracing and, indeed, defined it 
correctly as follows: "funds are traced or identified based on the assumption that the 
entity/debtor spends its own money from the accounts before it spends the security 
interest proceeds or trust funds. If the account balance falls below the amount of such 
proceeds, the security interest in the funds held in the account reduces accordingly." R. 
1255-56. However, Mr. Judd then departed from the proper application of LIBR in three 
separate instances, departures which Mr. Judd acknowledged but justified on his 
proffered distinction for treating transfers between Great Basin's accounts not as transfers 
for LIBR purposes, a distinction he admitted was unsupported by any authority. First, 
Mr. Judd assumed that the $1,500,000 which was withdrawn from the Concentration 
Account on December 21, 2000 consisted entirely of trust funds (or Volvo truck sales 
9
 Mr. Judd was asked whether he had relied on any authority to support his departure 
from LIBR and he responded as follows: 
Q. Do you have any authority for the tracing treatment that is reflected in your 
treatment of the $1.5 million? 
A. Making reference to legal authority? 
Q. Any authority - accounting authority, tracing authority, legal authority. 
A. No. 
R. 1136. 
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proceeds) even though non-trust funds were available in the Concentration Account in the 
amount of $1,297,489. See AppIt's Add. Ex. 2. Under LIBR's tracing rules, non-trust 
funds are treated as having been withdrawn from the Concentration Account before the 
trust fiinds. Thus, Mr. Judd departed from LIBR rules in his treatment of the $1,500,000 
withdrawal on December 21, 2000. 
Second, Mr. Judd assumed that $291,919 of the $500,000 that was withdrawn 
from the Concentration Account on December 22, 2000, consisted of "trust funds" (or 
Volvo truck sales proceeds) even though non-trust funds were available in the 
Concentration Account in the amount of $933,415. R. 1131. Under LIBR, those non-
trust funds should have been treated as withdrawn from the Concentration Account 
before the trust funds. Thus, in his treatment of the December 22, 2000 withdrawal, 
Mr. Judd again departed from LIBR's first rule. 
Third, Mr. Judd assumed that the $900,000 that was wire transferred on December 
29, 2000, by Great Basin from the First Security Account to the Concentration Account 
consisted of $693,132 of "trust funds" (or Volvo truck sales proceeds) even though under 
LIBR's second rule, subsequent deposits into the Concentration Account are presumed 
not to replenish trust funds. R. 1131. Once again, Mr. Judd departed from LIBR's 
neutral rules in order to make Volvo's claims work in this case. 
In order to justify Judd's departures, Volvo argues for an exception to LIBR and 
principally relies on three century-old cases in support thereof. However, Volvo's 
argument for altering the two well accepted and longstanding rules of LIBR in cases in 
which funds "are transferred but not dissipated" should be rejected for a number of 
1 O 
reasons. First, the modern UCC cases apply LIBR without recognizing the departure 
suggested by Volvo. Second, even the old cases cited by Volvo do not stand for the legal 
proposition asserted by Volvo. All of these cases pre-dated the adoption of the UCC and 
as such their continuing validity is questionable. Moreover, these cases either involve 
wrongdoing by the trustee/debtor (e.g., Brennan, In re Oatway), or a circumstance in , 
which funds remained in the hands of the trustee-debtor (Lincoln). Clearly, neither of 
those circumstances exists here. Put simply, Volvo points to no case where its proposed 
exception to the LIBR rules is applied against an innocent transferee, such as Wells 
Fargo, and especially where the funds were dissipated at the debtor's own direction. 
Third, the undisputed facts of this case, including the fact that Wells Fargo is an innocent 
transferee, do not support a departure from LIBR, and in fact, show that LIBR should be 
applied strictly. Finally, the application of Volvo's proposed exception would not aid 
Volvo's cause because the funds in question have in fact been dissipated and non-
dissipation is the essential element of the exception. 
1. The Modern Cases Apply LIBR Without the Departure from the 
First Rule of LIBR that Volvo Suggests., 
The modern cases have adopted LIBR as the appropriate tracing method in 
determining whether trust funds that have been commingled with other funds are 
identifiable. In re JD Services, 284 B.R. at 297. In the modem commercial context, the 
cases apply LIBR's two rules strictly and neutrally, and without the exception Volvo 
advocates. See, ejj., Meyer v. Norwest Bank Iowa, Nat. Ass'n, 112 F.3d 946, 951 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (The court employed a strict LIBR analysis in that case and found that the 
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creditor could only trace a limited amount of funds.); Bank of Kansas v. Hutchison 
Health Services, Inc., 735 P.2d 256 (Kan. App. 1987) (The court employed a strict 
application of LIBR in determining that some of the proceeds from the debtor's 
disposition of collateral were "identifiable" and the security interest continued in those 
proceeds.); Foster v. Hill 275 F.3d 924, 927 n.l (10th Cir. 2001) (the Tenth Circuit 
provided an example of the application of LIBR in which it applied its two rules strictly.); 
In re Edison Brothers, Inc., 268 B.R. 409, 413-14 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (The application 
of LIBR defeated a party's claim to trust funds because the debtor's cash management 
account had been completely dissipated.). 
The reason the modern courts strictly apply LIBR is because the fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, or conscious wrongdoing that are often at the heart of the old common law 
cases cited by Volvo typically do not exist in a commercial setting. Rather, the cases 
most often deal with two innocent parties, as here. While the UCC recognizes that a 
secured party, by virtue of its security agreement, typically has greater rights in 
identifiable collateral than an unsecured creditor, when a secured party's collateral 
proceeds become commingled with other funds, the secured party's position becomes 
more akin to that of an unsecured creditor. The reason for that outcome is that a secured 
creditor, such as Volvo, could have protected itself by requiring the debtor to segregate 
its collateral proceeds (as Volvo did with Zions), but having failed to do so, the secured 
party cannot then complain that it may lose its security interest as to certain funds that are 
transferred to an innocent party. In short, modern courts will allow a secured party to 
trace its proceeds to the extent possible under a strict application of LIBR, but will go no 
on 
further absent exceptional circumstances because there is no difference or disparity in the 
equitable status between the secured creditor and the unsecured creditor.10 
2. Volvo's Cases Do Not Support A Departure from LIBR. 
Volvo relies primarily on three non-Utah cases from the early 1900's as alleged 
support for the proposition that the first mle of LIBR must be departed from when tracing 
funds that have been "transferred but not dissipated," which Volvo describes as the 
Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule.11 Applt's Brief at 28-32. However, those cases do not 
stand for the proposition asserted by Volvo. Rather, the cases ultimately turned on a 
finding of either conscious wrongdoing on the part of the holder of the funds or that the 
funds remained in the hands of the debtor-trustee, neither of which conditions exist in this 
case. Moreover, those cases were decided before the adoption of the UCC for the 
modem commercial world. 
10
 Another problem with Volvo's proposed exception is its potential complicated 
application in a modern commercial context because it is not clear when funds are 
"transferred but not dissipated." Such a proposed exception apparently introduces an 
"intent" element, i.e. at what point does the transfer change from a "regular" transfer to a 
transfer intended for dissipation? For instance, what if the funds are transferred from one 
account into another account and then sit there for an hour, or five hours, or one day, or 
one week? It would be difficult to make that determination for a single transfer let alone 
hundreds of transfers that may occur in a commercial context. And, in the case at bar, 
how would the district court determine that Great Basin's transfers of the $1.5 million 
and $500,000 in December of 2000 were not intended for dissipation? 
11
 Volvo also cites Waddell v. Waddell, 36 Utah 435, 104 P. 743 (1909), for the 
proposition that where trust funds are converted into another form of property (even if 
those trust funds have been commingled with other funds) that the trust will extend to 
that new property. Applt's Brief at 27. This is an overstatement. The court in Waddell 
made it clear that a trust can be imposed on new property only to the extent that the 
original trust proceeds are traceable into that property. Id. at 749. Because Volvo cannot 
trace any of its collateral proceeds into the $900,000 wire transfer on December 29, 2000, 
it has no claim against Wells Fargo. 
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a. Brennan v. Tillinghast 
The first case that Volvo relies on is Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201 F. 609 (6th Cir. 
1913). In that case, John Brennan borrowed $1,000 from Ironwood Bank ("Ironwood") 
secured in part by 200 shares of the capital stock of Shattuck-Arizona Copper Company. 
Subsequently, Ironwood wrongfully sold 195 of the shares of the stock and deposited the 
$3,558.75 in proceeds into a pre-existing account that Ironwood had with Duluth Bank. 
Against this open account, Ironwood subsequently drew four drafts in favor of the 
American Express Company for which Ironwood was paid $2,807.32 in cash by 
American Express. At all times until the Ironwood was closed and a receiver was 
appointed, it continually had in cash in its own vaults the sum of at least $3,500. 
Eventually, more than $15,000 in cash came into the hands of the receiver of Ironwood. 
Brennan filed an action against the receiver asserting a preferred claim as to the value of 
the stock he had pledged as collateral. The appeals court upheld the decision in favor of 
Brennan based on the analysis that the four cash drafts drawn in favor of American 
Express, constituted in effect, a transfer of $2,807.32 of the stock proceeds to cash which 
remained in the vaults of Ironwood Bank until it came into the possession of the receiver. 
Id. at 613. The court rejected the receiver's tracing argument similar to LIBR's first rule, 
holding that Brennan should prevail over the conscious wrongdoer, Ironwood, i.e., "[i]n 
such a case, it must be held that the trust attached to the substituted form in which the 
property is retained by the tort-feasor...". Id. at 614. In other words, the court refused to 
apply the neutral rules of LIBR to the benefit of the wrongdoer. 
?? 
b. In re Oatway 
The second case cited by Volvo is In In re Oatway, 2 Ch. Div. 356 (1903). In that 
case, Maxwell Skipper and L.J. Oatway were the co-trustees of the estate of Charles 
Skipper. Three thousand pounds was advanced in breach of trust out of Charles 
Skipper's estate to Maxwell Skipper, which advance was secured by a mortgage of an 
undivided share of certain real estate to which Maxwell Skipper was entitled under his 
grandfather's will. Oatway subsequently sold Skipper's undivided interest in the real 
estate for the sum of 7000 pounds and placed that money into his own bank account. 
Oatway never paid back the 3000 pounds to the estate of Charles Skipper. Subsequently, 
Oatway purchased 1000 shares of Oceana stock for 2137 pounds which he paid for by 
check from his bank account. At the time the Oceana stock was purchased, Oatway's 
checking account contained a balance of 6,635 pounds which included the 3000 pounds 
that belonged to the estate of Charles Skipper. Subsequently, Oatway's bank account 
was exhausted. Oatway died and the issue decided by the court was whether the estate of 
Charles Skipper or the estate of L. J. Oatway should receive the Oceana stock. The 
English Court of Chancery rejected the argument that because Oatway's own funds in the 
checking account were in excess of the 2137 pounds that were paid for the stock, he was 
entitled to withdraw that sum and apply it for his own purposes, and the Oceana shares 
should belong to his estate. The court held that because Oatway was a fiduciary, "he 
cannot maintain that the investment which remains represents his own money alone and 
that what has been spent and can no longer be traced and recovered was the money 
belonging to the trust." Id. at 360. The court also held that Oatway "never was entitled 
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to withdraw the 2137/. from the account, or . . . hold it. . . freed from the charge in favor 
of the trust." Id. at 361. Thus, the holding in Oatway is based on the fact that Oatway 
had acted wrongfully and that as a fiduciary he should not be able to use the tracing rules 
to the detriment of the beneficiary. 
c. City of Lincoln v. Morrison 
Volvo also cites to City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 90 N.W. 905 (Neb. 1902). In that 
case, the City of Lincoln, in contravention of the law, had placed $5,000 of the City's 
money into Lincoln Savings Bank, taking a certificate of deposit in return. After the 
deposit was made, the Bank had $41,699.96 in cash on hand. Subsequently, the Bank 
purchased state warrants for $36,750 using as partial payment $1,750 of the cash on hand 
at the Bank. Thereafter, the Bank suspended operations and a receiver was appointed. 
The receiver received, inter alia, $3,334.37 from the sale of the state warrants. The City 
then asserted a preferred claim for the $5,000. 
The court ultimately ruled in favor of the City, finding that it had a preferred claim 
to the remaining funds from the sale of the warrants, or the $3,334.37. Id. at 909. In 
reaching this conclusion, the court held that when trust monies are commingled with non-
1 ? trust monies remaining in the hands of the trustee, then the cestui que trust is entitled to 
a charge upon the whole so long as any portion of the mass into which the trust monies 
The Lincoln court described this factor as requiring the beneficiary to "show that the 
estate out of which he claims such preference has been increased to some extent by the 
misappropriation of the trust property." Id. at 908. However, the court also rejected the 
Bank's argument that the "fact of use of the money in the trustee's general business or in 
paying his debts is, in effect, an increase of the assets..." Id. Thus, Lincoln provides no 
guidance in a case like this where the funds in question were transferred to Wells Fargo 
to be used to cover business expenses. 
were placed remained in any form, and may be claimed. (Emphasis added). Id. at 908. 
Because the court found that the City had a charge (or lien) on the whole of the funds out 
of which the warrants were purchased, it followed that it also had a charge (or lien) on the 
warrants. Id. at 909. Indeed, the court did not attempt to do a LIBR tracing analysis to 
determine whether the City's money was used to purchase the warrants. Rather, the court 
simply concluded that as to as to the bank (the debtor/trustee) it did not matter that "no 
one can say what part of the cash on hand in the bank went into the warrants" because 
where the bank still held the asset it could not avoid its duty to the trust beneficiary. 
Lincoln is inapposite for several reasons. First, its general holding has been 
rejected in modern cases which hold that merely tracing funds into a general account or 
showing that assets were increased is not sufficient to establish that the funds have been 
traced. See, e ^ , In re Winkle, 128 B.R. 529, 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (the 
beneficiaries of a trust must be able to trace their funds to identifiable trust assets and not 
merely to the general funds of the debtor). Second, Lincoln's rationale was that the 
debtor-trustee (which in this case would have been Great Basin) remained obligated if 
any part or form of the trust funds remained in its hands. For that reason, the Lincoln 
holding, even if good law, would have no application as against an innocent third party 
like Wells Fargo because the funds at issue no longer exist. 
13
 Thus, Lincoln also held that "if the whole of the cash . . . was used in paying off other 
depositors or in running expenses, the city is not entitled to a preference over general 
creditors. . . ." Id. at 908. 
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Accordingly, the courts in Brennan, Oatway and Lincoln reached the conclusions 
they did because of conscious wrongdoing by the person against whom the trust was 
impressed or because the funds remained in the hands of the trustee. They did not adopt 
the exception for funds "transferred but not dissipated" as claimed by Volvo here.15 
In footnote 11 of its appellate brief, Volvo cites six other cases as alleged support for 
the proposition that the first rule of LIBR does not apply when funds are transferred but 
not dissipated. However, these cases are distinguishable and do not support Volvo's 
argument. In In re Pacat Finance Corp., 27 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1928), Beradini 
contended that the trustee in bankruptcy of Pacat Finance Corporation came into 
possession of 750,000 lire which belonged to Beradini and Beradini sought to establish 
his right to that money under, inter alia, a constructive trust theory. Beradini contended 
that he could trace his own dollars into lire credits held by Credito Italiano and then back 
into dollars held by the trustee. The court conceded that none of Beradini's dollars could 
literally be traced into any of the lire credits, but nevertheless still imposed a trust in 
favor of Beradini on monies held by the trustee. Id. at 813. Thus, Pacat has no 
application here because it is at odds with modem case law which only permits tracing to 
"identifiable proceeds." In Mitchell v. Dunn, 294 P. 386 (Cal. 1930), a guardian took 
funds from an incompetent and commingled them with her own funds. In deciding who 
was entitled to property purchased with the funds, the court ruled in favor of the 
incompetent because the guardian had been dishonest. Republic Supply Co. of California 
v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935), involved a situation in which Richfield, 
with knowledge that Universal had cash of $1,625,000 in its bank account, deliberately 
purchased sufficient stock in Universal to procure control of Universal. Richfield then 
misappropriated the cash and commingled it with Richfield's general funds in its 
checking account. Given the facts, the court found that general tracing principles should 
not be used to favor Richfield. In re Erie Trust Co., 191 A. 613 (Pa. 1937), also involved 
wrongdoing. In that case, the estate of W.W. Gingrich filed an action against the Erie 
Trust Company because it took cash from the estate as commissions to which it was not 
entitled. Likewise, in Central Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hans, 545 N.E.2d 1063 (111. App. Ct. 
1989), the Hanses had participated in a scheme in which they would dispose of certain 
assets and execute certain notes in favor of Lindstrom to keep their farm operational. The 
court also found that LIBR did not even apply in that case. Finally, In re Goldberg, 168 
B.R. 382, 385 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), contains language that actually supports Wells 
Fargo's position. The court stated that "[gjenerally, it is true that where a constructive 
trust is sought to be imposed against the property of an insolvent debtor, strict tracing is 
required. The purpose of this rule is to treat creditors equally." (Emphasis added). 
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 Volvo also cites Restatement of Restitution §§211 and 212, Restatement of Trusts § 
202, and Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 928, Rev. 2d ed. (1982), as further 
O/C 
3. The Undisputed Facts in this Case Do Not Support a Departure 
From the Universally Accepted Application of LIBR. 
On the undisputed facts of this case the two well accepted rules of LIBR should be 
followed for several reasons. First, there is no alleged wrongdoing on the part of Wells 
Fargo, which was an innocent transferee in the ordinary course of business. Wells Fargo 
support for its argument that the first rule of LIBR should not be followed in this case. 
Volvo is wrong. These sections do not state that funds that "are transferred but 
dissipated" must be treated differently from other transfers, as suggested by Volvo. 
Rather, Restatement of Restitution § Section 211 indicates that where a person 
wrongfully commingles personal and trust funds into a single account, the claimant may 
be entitled to assert an equitable lien upon whatever remains of the whole of the deposit. 
See comment a. to Section 211. Furthermore, the modem courts hold that the beneficiary 
of a trust must be able to trace its funds to identifiable trust assets and not merely to 
general funds in the hands of the debtor. See In re Winkle 128 B.R. 529, 535 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio. 1991). Restatement of Restitution § 212 appears to follow a strict application 
of LIBR and states that where a person wrongfully commingles personal and trusts funds, 
makes withdrawals that are dissipated and then subsequently adds money of his own to 
the fund, the claimant ordinarily cannot enforce an equitable lien upon the account for a 
sum greater than the lowest intermediate balance of the deposit. Restatement of Trusts § 
202 simply provides that a beneficiary of a trust is entitled, at its option, to enforce a 
constructive trust or equitable lien on other property acquired with trust funds, so long as 
the other property is held by the trustee and can be traced. Finally, Bogert indicates that 
Oatway has been followed in some jurisdictions, but not in others, and is critical of those 
courts that follow Oatway without regard to strict tracing rules or technical reasoning. 
Bogert states, 
"[t]he results in the Oatway case and the authorities following it seem based 
on a strong preference for the trust claimant as against a trustee who has 
been guilty of an intentional breach of trust. As between these two 
disputants it is natural that the courts should favor the beneficiary without 
regard to strict tracing rules or technical reasoning. But they ignore the fact 
that the real parties in interest who are contesting with the beneficiary are 
the creditors of the defaulting trustee who had advanced value and have a 
claim against all his assets which are not earmarked as security for other 
claims. The creditors' position would seem fully as strong from an ethical 
and equitable point of view as that of the beneficiary of the trust who is 
usually a donee. 
Bogert, §928 at pp. 491-92. 
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had a typical banking relationship with the Great Basin Entities in which it provided 
requested banking services to assist Great Basin with its cash management system. 
Between December 27 and December 29, 2000, Wells Fargo representatives received 
daily overdraft management reports which indicated that if all of the checks that had been 
presented against the Concentration Account were processed and honored, then the 
Concentration Account would be overdrawn. In each instance, in accordance with Wells 
Fargo policy, a Wells Fargo representative contacted Great Basin's authorized 
representative who responded that Great Basin would make the requisite wire transfers 
into the Concentration Account to cover any overdrafts, which Great Basin in fact did. 
Wells Fargo had absolutely no knowledge that the Great Basin Entities were in default of 
their obligations to Volvo. As such, Wells Fargo appropriately permitted the checks to be 
processed in the normal course.16 Based on these undisputed facts, there is no basis to 
alter LIBR's rules as to Wells Fargo. 
Second, in this particular case Volvo is not entitled to any special relief from the 
LIBR rules because Volvo knew in the fall of 2000 that Great Basin was delinquent in its 
payments to Volvo. Indeed, Volvo believed that Great Basin was deliberately 
Volvo attempts to attribute some responsibility to Wells Fargo because it knew that 
Volvo provided inventory financing to the Great Basin Entities. However, Volvo's 
argument falls far short. Such knowledge does not in and of itself form a basis to impose 
liability on Wells Fargo. See Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England, 897 
F.2d 611, 612 (1st Cir. 1990). Large truck dealers such as Great Basin almost always 
obtain inventory financing so such knowledge by itself, would not have been alarming to 
Wells Fargo or constituted a basis for further inquiry. Also, it is not unusual for sellers of 
financed inventory to use a portion of the proceeds from those sales to run its business 
operations. As such, even if Wells Fargo had known that Great Basin was using some of 
the proceeds from the sales of trucks secured by Volvo to pay its business expenses in 
December of 2000, this knowledge would not have raised any "red flag" to Wells Fargo. 
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withholding payments from Volvo on sold vehicles. R. 1029-36. Notwithstanding this 
information, Volvo failed to take any of the following actions available to it: (1) ask 
Great Basin to segregate the funds from the sale of its collateral from the other funds that 
were being generated by the various Great Basin Entities; (2) suspend Great Basin's lines 
of credit under the Volvo Floor Plan Agreements; (3) take possession of the financed 
vehicles that constituted its collateral, which vehicles it left at Great Basin; (4) require 
direct payment from the parties who were purchasing the financed vehicles from Great 
Basin (instead Volvo continued to allow those proceeds to be deposited into the 
Concentration Account until late December 2000); and (5) notify Wells Fargo that Great 
Basin was in default of its obligations under the Volvo Floor Plan Agreements. In fact, 
Volvo did not provide notice of any kind to Wells Fargo that there were concerns or 
17 
problems relating the funds in the Concentration Account. Since Volvo was better 
positioned to protect its security interest than Wells Fargo, the LIBR rules should not be 
altered to benefit Volvo. 
Third, it would be especially unfair in this case to alter the LIBR rules to benefit 
Volvo over Wells Fargo because the proceeds in question were dissipated by Great Basin 
to cover business expenses. In fact, nearly $500,000 of the transferred monies went to 
Volvo Trucks. It would be patently unfair to impose liability on Wells Fargo which 
17
 The reason Volvo may have failed to act was that a pending sale was being negotiated 
of substantially all of Great Basin's Volvo-related dealership assets to its sister company, 
Volvo Trucks. A major condition of the sale was that the Great Basin truck dealerships 
needed to be ongoing business concerns. R. 1031, 1045, 1166-84. However, to 
accomplish that condition Great Basin needed to use the proceeds from the sales of the 
Volvo trucks to keep its business operations going. 
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retains no funds, while allowing Volvo to obtain damages for monies that ended up in the 
hands of its sister company, Volvo Trucks. 
Finally, Mr. Judd candidly stated in his deposition that another rationale for his 
approach in applying LIBR was to apply it in a way that most protected Volvo. R. 1141. 
That rationale is contrary to the purpose of LIBR, which is designed to protect fairly and 
neutrally the rights of all creditors. For instance, if under LIBR the proceeds are not 
traceable into the commingled Concentration Account, then Volvo would become an 
unsecured creditor of the Great Basin Entities to the extent of its loss, and it must be 
treated on an equal basis with other unsecured creditors of the Great Basin Entities. See 
J.D. Services, Inc., 284 B.R. at 298 (since the Bank could not trace the funds, the Bank 
became a creditor to the extent of its loss and had to be treated on an equal basis with 
other similarly situated creditors). LIBR cannot be manipulated in the manner advocated 
by Volvo and Mr. Judd to protect Volvo, because that would be unfair to other creditors 
and innocent third parties like Wells Fargo. 
4. Volvo's Theory Has No Relevance In This Case Because The 
Funds Were In Fact Dissipated. 
Finally, even if this Court were to adopt the exception to LIBR advocated by 
Volvo, the exception has no application in this case because the funds at issue - the 
$900,000 wire transferred into the Concentration Account by Great Basin on 
December 29, 2000 - were in fact "dissipated" by Great Basin. Specifically, the funds 
were dissipated because they were used to cover the checks drawn by Great Basin to pay 
its regular business expenses. As such, the exception to LIBR suggested by Volvo is 
factually inapplicable in this case.18 
C. Insley Has No Application To This Case. 
Volvo argues that the holding in Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 
P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986), means that Volvo's "interest takes precedence over any interest 
Wells Fargo could possibly claim." Applt's Brief at 18. Volvo is simply wrong because 
in Insley, unlike this case, the proceeds were traceable and Draper Bank exercised a set-
off. In Insley, the debtor had a bank account at Draper Bank. Id. at 1342. Sometime 
prior to October 5, 1979, five checks totaling $91,621.25 were drawn against the bank 
account and were presented to Draper Bank for payment. Draper Bank determined that 
the account contained insufficient funds to cover the checks but decided, without 
consulting the debtor, to pay them in overdraft. On October 5, 1979, Draper Bank 
prepared a debit memo to the debtor informing it that it intended to cover the checks and 
would be charging a $15 service charge, along with 18% interest for the debtor's use of 
bank funds. The debtor's bank statement, shows that the transaction was posted on 
October 9, 1979. Id. On the same date, the debtor completed the sale of a backhoe to a 
third party and $237,918.30 in funds from that sale were deposited into the debtor's bank 
account at Draper Bank. Id. Draper Bank, in turn, credited the debtor's account and then 
18
 Indeed, the three cases of Oatway, Brennan and City of Lincoln, upon which Volvo 
relies, all involved scenarios in which the funds or property at issue were still in 
existence. Volvo already has had the opportunity to make a claim to any remaining 
proceeds from the sale of its collateral in Great Basin's bankruptcy case. Indeed, Volvo, 
Zions Bank, Associates and others battled in Great Basin's bankruptcy case for many 
months over how the remaining funds, i.e. non-dissipated funds, should be divided. 
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paid itself by exercising a set-off for the money it had previously advanced to pay the 
overdrafts. The creditor who claimed a security interest in the backhoe, brought an action 
against Draper Bank for converting the proceeds from the sale of the backhoe. Id. at 
1346-47. The Utah Supreme Court, ruling for the creditor, focused on Draper Bank's 
argument, under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-104(i) that Article 9 does not apply "to any 
right of setoff," and that therefore the UCC will have no application when there is a 
priority dispute between a party that has a perfected security interest and a party that has 
exercised a right of set-off. Id. at 1345. The supreme court rejected the argument that 
under pre-Revised Article 9 the creditor's perfected security interest in cash proceeds of 
inventory sold by the debtor had priority over Draper Bank's set-off rights. Id. at 1347. 
Insley has no applicability here for several reasons. First, unlike the debtor in 
Insley, Volvo cannot trace its proceeds into the Concentration Account on December 29, 
2000. Second, unlike Draper Bank in Insley, Wells Fargo did not exercise a set-off in 
this case. Here, Great Basin took the affirmative and voluntary step of wiring money 
from its First Security Account into the Concentration Account for the express purpose of 
covering the checks for the business expenses it had written. 
This distinction between a voluntary payment and a set-off has been recognized in 
Textron Financial Corp. v. Firstar Bank Wisconsin, 579 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). 
The debtor in Textron, Nelson's Sports Center, operated a retail boat and accessory 
business. Nelson's had loans with Firstar Bank that were secured by a blanket security 
interest in all of Nelson's assets except those specifically pledged elsewhere. Nelson's 
also had a security agreement with Textron Financial to finance boats, trailers, and other 
marine products. After receiving final payment on a boat financed by Textron, Nelson's 
deposited the full amount in its checking account with Firstar. Nelson's failed to 
promptly pay Textron on the boat, thereby violating its security agreement. Three days 
later, with Nelson's express permission, Firstar recovered funds from Nelson's checking 
account to be applied to a delinquent loan. Firstar claimed it had no notice that the funds 
were proceeds from inventory sold under Textron's security interest. Textron brought an 
action against Firstar claiming wrongful conversion. One of the arguments Textron made 
was that Firstar's collection really amounted to a set-off. However, the appellate court 
rejected that argument, holding: 
As established in Commercial Discount Corp., a bank's right to keep a set-
off is defeated by any security interest in the same funds, whether or not the 
bank had knowledge that its set-off violated a security interest. We do not 
agree, however, that Nelson's loan payment was a set-off. As Firstar notes, 
a set-off is the involuntary taking of funds from a debtor's account. 
Because no facts are alleged that would tend to show the loan payment to 
Firstar was involuntary, we reject this claim. 
Id. at 592 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).19 Likewise, in Security State Bank v. 
Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 965 F. Supp. 1237 (N.D. Iowa 1997), the court applied LIBR 
It is also clear from Utah case law that the $900,000 wire payment made by Great 
Basin to Wells Fargo could not have constituted a set-off because the requirements of 
"mutuality" and "separate transactions" are lacking. As stated in Mark VII Fin. 
Consultants v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah App. 1990), a "setoff refers to an 
unrelated transaction." See also Blacks Law Dictionary 1404 (8th ed. 2004) (Set-off 
defined as a "defendant's counterdemand against the plaintiffs claim"). Accordingly, no 
set-off could have occurred in this case because the obligations that purportedly gave rise 
to the set-off arose from the same transaction. Based upon Great Basin's assurance of 
payment, Wells Fargo processed Great Basin's checks and then Great Basin made the 
promised wire transfer from the First Security Account to the Concentration Account to 
cover those checks. It was all part of the same transaction, and thus could not have been 
a set-off. The requirement of mutuality is also lacking in this case. See Mark VII, 792 
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and found that all of the proceeds from the sale of Security Bank's collateral were 
dissipated when the funding account became overdrawn, and Firstar Bank's payment of 
overdrafts did not change this result since the payments were made by transfers from the 
debtor's line of credit on debtor's own instructions, rather than from Firstar's initiative. 
Because Wells Fargo merely accepted a voluntary payment from Great Basin to 
cover the overdrafts, Insley has no application to this case. 
POINT 2 
UTAH'S UCC PERMITTED 
WELLS FARGO, AS AN INNOCENT TRANSFEREE, 
TO RECEIVE FUNDS FROM THE CONCENTRATION ACCOUNT 
FREE AND CLEAR OF VOLVO'S SECURITY INTEREST 
Although the District Court was not required to address Wells Fargo's additional, 
alternative grounds for dismissal, Volvo's claims against Wells Fargo are also barred by 
either Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-332 of Revised Article 9 of Utah's UCC, or Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) thereto of pre-Revised Article 9. 
P.2d at 132. This requirement "allows parties that owe mutual debts to state the accounts 
between them, subtract one from the other and pay only the balance." See Blacks Law 
Dictionary 1404 (8th ed. 2004). However, on December 29, 2000, which is the date 
Volvo claims Wells Fargo exercised the set-off, there were no mutual debts that existed 
between Wells Fargo and Great Basin. Although Volvo claims that Great Basin owed an 
obligation to Wells Fargo to cover the overdraft, Wells Fargo owed no corresponding 
obligation to Great Basin because there were no funds in the Concentration Account. 
They had all been dissipated and it contained a negative balance. Furthermore, the 
$900,000 wire transfer into the Concentration Account on December 29, 2000 could not 
have created the corresponding obligation on the part of Wells Fargo because that 
transfer represented the payment to Wells Fargo. 
20
 On appeal, this Court can affirm dismissal on alternative grounds that were properly 
presented below. See Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("[a]n appellate 
court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court 
relied on some other grounds."). 
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A. Revised Article 9 of Utah Code Ann, § 70A-9a-332 Bars Volvo's Claims 
Against Wells Fargo. 
Section 70A-9a-332 of Revised Article 9 of Utah's UCC, which was enacted by 
the Utah Legislature in 2000, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free 
of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in 
collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party. 
Barkley Clark, a respected commentator on the UCC, explained the policy behind 
Section 70A-9a-332 as follows: 
Under Rev. UCC § 9-332(b), a transferee of funds from the deposit account 
takes free for a security interest in proceeds unless the transferee is acting in 
"collusion" with the debtor. Under this rule, non-collusive transferees of 
funds from the debtor's deposit account are protected more than any other 
class of transferees. Their knowledge of the prior security interest is 
irrelevant in the absence of collusion. The policy behind this priority, as 
stated by the drafters, is to respect the finality of payments in the banking 
system. Protected transferees include junior secured parties. . . . 
See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code., Rev. 
Ed., Volume 1 at § 16.07[8] (emphasis added). Revised Section 70A-9a-332(b) re-
codifies pre-Revised Section 70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) thereto except 
that it sets forth a narrower "bad actor/collusion" test as contrasted with the "ordinary 
course of business" test set forth in Section 70A-9-306(2). 
Volvo does not argue that if Section 332(b) applies, its claim fails. Volvo, 
however, argues that Section 332(b) does not apply to this case because its effective date 
was July 1, 2001 (see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-701(l)). Volvo is mistaken. The Utah 
Legislature indicated that the provisions of Revised Article 9 could be considered in 
35 
transactions or liens that fell within its scope even if they occurred prior to Revised 
Article 9's effective date. Specifically, Revised Section 70A-9a-702(l) provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this part, this act applies to a 
transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien was 
entered into or created before this act takes effect. 
Volvo argues that Revised Section 70A-9a-702(i)'s transition rule does not apply 
to this case because another transition rule, Section 70A-9a-709(l), precludes the 
application of Revised Article 9 where the relative priorities between the parties were 
established prior to July 1, 2001: 
This act [Revised Article 9] determines the priority of conflicting claims to 
collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established 
before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines priority. 
However, Volvo is wrong because this case does not involve a priority dispute between 
competing creditors because Wells Fargo does not claim a priority to the funds in 
91 question. Rather, because Wells Fargo is a transferee in the ordinary course and 
without collusion under the UCC, it simply took free of any security interest claimed by 
Volvo. In other words, there are not relative priorities at issue within the meaning of 
Section 70A-9a-709(l). 
Furthermore, although Volvo argues that Revised Article 9 cannot apply because 
statutes do not operate retroactively, Applt's Brief at p. 38, that is not true if the statute 
expressly provides for retroactive application. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1953) ("No 
part of these statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."). Because the 
11 For that reason, Volvo's reliance on Interbusiness Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Mifflintown, 318 F. Supp. 2d 230 (M.D. Pa. 1994) is misplaced. Applt's Bnef at 37-38. 
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transition rules of Revised Article 9 do provide expressly that Revised Article 9's 
provisions should be applied to transactions or liens that fall within its scope even if they 
occurred prior to Revised Article 9's effective date, Volvo's retroactivity argument must 
fail. Accordingly, Section 70A-9a-332 bars Volvo's claims against Wells Fargo. 
B. If The Court Determines that Pre-Revised Article 9 Applies in this 
Case, Then Section 70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) Bar 
Volvo's Claims Against Wells Fargo. 
Alternatively, if pre-Revised Article 9 applies, Volvo's claims are barred by pre-
Revised Section 70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) thereto. Section 70A-9-306(2) 
states as follows: 
(2) Except where this chapter or Chapter 2a, Leases, otherwise 
provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, 
exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was 
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and 
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received 
by the debtor. 
However, Official Comment 2(c) to this section identifies an exception to a secured 
creditor's right to recover proceeds transferred to third parties in the ordinary course: 
(c) Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking 
account and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of 
the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may 
have in them as proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and 
transfers in ordinary course. The law of fraudulent conveyances would no 
doubt in appropriate cases support: recovery of proceeds by a secured party 
from a transferee out of ordinary course or otherwise in collusion with the 
debtor to defraud the secured party. 
The application of Official Comment 2(c) to this fact situation is a matter of first 
impression in Utah. If Official Comment 2(c) does apply, it disposes of Volvo's claims 
because the transfer was clearly in the ordinaiy course. However, Volvo argues that 
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Official Comment 2(c) should not apply in this case for a number of reasons. First, 
Volvo argues that Official Comment 2(c) conflicts with the language of Section 9-306(2) 
and that the latter controls. Second, Volvo suggests that the ordinary course defense of 
Official Comment 2(c) appears to be barred by the holding in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales 
King International 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000). Applt's Brief at 42. Third, Volvo 
contends that an ordinary course defense is precluded by Insley. Id. at 40-41. Fourth, 
Volvo argues that even if Utah law is deemed silent on the issue, the weight of out-of-
state authority precludes an "ordinary course" defense under Official Comment 2(c) in 
this case. Id. at 43-44. Finally, Volvo argues that even if the ordinary course defense 
does apply, Wells Fargo has failed to satisfy the requirements of that defense. Id. 
As shown, all of these arguments fail, and thus the Court should affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
1. Official Comments Provide Persuasive Guidance to Courts. 
Volvo first argues that the language of Official Comment 2(c) cannot trump the 
plain language of Section 9-306(2). Applt's Brief at 40. However, the drafters of the 
UCC also drafted the official comments thereto and they obviously did not regard 
Official Comment 2(c) as inconsistent with the language of Section 9-306(2). Moreover, 
the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held the official comments to the UCC provide 
persuasive guidance to courts. See, Simplot 17 P.3d at 1.108. 
2. In Simplot, the Utah Supreme Court Specifically Left Open the 
Question of Whether Official Comment 2(c) is Authoritative, 
Volvo contends that J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King International 17 P.3d 1100 
(Utah 2000), appears to bar the ordinary course defense in this case. Applt's Brief at 42. 
However, Volvo ignores the Simplot court's language directly relating to Official 
Comment 2(c) that the issue is open in Utah: 
The official comments to the UCC have not been adopted by the Utah 
legislature and are therefore not authoritative, but rather, persuasive as to 
the code's interpretation. Nor is it the case that this court has previously 
recognized Comment 2(c) as an exception to the Code's general priority 
rules. However, we find it unnecessary to address the authority of 
Comment 2(c) at this time because it is not applicable to the instant case. 
Id at 1108. 
In Simplot, Bountiful Valley Produce ("BVP") produced onion and squash crops. 
Simplot sold chemicals and fertilizer on credit to BVP and to secure its interests Simplot 
maintained annual security agreements with BVP. BVP entered into a marketing 
agreement with Sales King. As BVP's agent, Sales King sold BVP's crops but never 
took ownership of them. Pursuant to their agreement, Sales King collected the proceeds 
from the crop sales and then retained amounts from those proceeds to cover its sales 
commissions and various expenses. Simplot was not paid for the chemicals and fertilizer 
that it provided to BVP in 1995 and 1996, and it brought suit against Sales King for 
conversion of the crop proceeds. As a defense, Sales King argued that it should be 
allowed to retain the proceeds from the crop sales because they were paid to it in the 
ordinary course of BVP's business under Section 9-306 and Official Comment 2(c). The 
Utah Supreme Court found it was unnecessary to address the authority of Official 
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Comment 2(c) because it only applies if the "cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's 
checking account" and since B VP never had access or control over the cash proceeds, 
Official Comment 2(c) was not applicable in the case. Id. at 1108-09. 
Accordingly, Simplot is distinguishable because the debtor, BVP, never obtained 
control of the money, never deposited the funds into its checking account and thus never 
made any payments to Simplot out of its checking account. Further, in leaving open the 
authority of Official Comment 2(c), Simplot actually suggests that § 9-306(2) and 
Official Comment 2(c) may be applicable where a party receives a voluntary payment 
from a debtor in the ordinary course which is exactly what happened in this case. 
3. Insley Does Not Preclude Application of Official Comment 2(c), 
Volvo argues that the supreme court's holding in Insley also precludes application 
of the ordinary course defense under Official Comment 2(c). Applt's Brief at 40. 
However, Insley was decided 14 years before Simplot, and the supreme court's indication 
in Simplot that the authority of Official Comment 2(c) is an open question is the latest 
pronouncement. Obviously, the supreme court did not read Insley to the contrary. 
Moreover, as discussed above, the Insley case is factually distinguishable both 
because Volvo's truck sales proceeds cannot be traced into the December 29, 2000 wire 
transfer and because the transfer was expressly made by Great Basin to cover the specific 
checks in process and was not a set-off. 
Volvo also contends based on Insley that its perfected security interest in the 
proceeds from the sale of its collateral trumps every defense and argument of Wells 
Fargo. Applt's Brief at 41. However, Volvo's analysis of the effect of the perfection of a 
i n 
security interest under the UCC is flawed. While it is true that once a party obtains a 
perfected security interest it need only file UCC continuation statements to maintain that 
perfection, it is not true that the secured party is never at risk of losing its collateral. The 
UCC, both under Revised Article 9 and pre-Revised Article 9, recognizes a myriad of 
situations in which a secured creditor can lose its collateral despite having a perfected 
security interest. For example, under pre-Revised Article 9, a secured party may lose its 
security interest if (a) its collateral proceeds cannot be traced and become unidentifiable 
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3); (b) its collateral proceeds are paid to an ordinary 
course transferee under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2); (c) its collateral is purchased by 
a buyer in the ordinary course under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-307; or (d) the secured 
party becomes aware of a debtor's name change and yet fails to file a new financing 
statement under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-402(7). Likewise, under Revised Article 9, a 
secured party may lose its security interest to a transferee of funds from a deposit account 
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-332, and to a bank that sets off funds in a deposit 
account under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-340, unless the secured party has entered into a 
control agreement. A secured creditor's security interest may also be defeated by 
common law defenses such as estoppel and waiver, See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103. 
Moreover, Volvo's assertion that Wells Fargo should have undertaken a UCC-1 
search of all the filings against the Great Basin Entities lacks merit. First, there is 
absolutely no way that, in the space of a few hours, Wells Fargo could have undertaken a 
search of the UCC-1 records relating to all of the Great Basin Entities, let alone 
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determine what all the numerous filings may have meant in that short time. Second, it 
would be bad public policy for the courts to impose liability on a financial institution 
simply because it covers an overdraft without having done a UCC-1 search. In fact, the 
courts have already recognized that because of the need for finality in banking 
transactions there are good commercial reasons for not imposing, even on sophisticated 
lenders, the responsibility of contacting inventory financiers to secure permission to take 
payment from a dealer's ordinary bank account. See Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank 
of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 612 (1st Cir. 1990). That policy is reflected inbothpre-
Revised and Revised Article 9. 
Finally, Volvo's suggestion that Wells Fargo should have just returned the checks 
prior to the midnight deadline is without merit. It makes no sense for a bank, which has a 
good business relationship with its customer and which is not aware that its customer has 
any financial problems, to return checks that its customer has promised to cover, and in 
fact, did cover. Indeed, if financial institutions were to adopt a policy of always returning 
checks in order to protect themselves from such liability, it would have a detrimental 
effect on our economy which relies to a large extent on the free flow of goods and credit. 
4. The Weight of the Out-of-State Authority Supports the 
Application of 9-306(2) and Official Comment (2). 
Volvo further argues that if the authority of Official Comment 2(c) is an open 
question in Utah, this Court should not allow the ordinary course defense because the 
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 Even if Wells Fargo knew of Volvo's security interest, that knowledge would not have 
alerted Wells Fargo to any problems because Great Basin was permitted under the Volvo 
Floor Plan Agreements to sell Volvo trucks in the ordinary course of its business and to 
use the profits associated with those sales in its own business operations. R. 865, 923. 
weight of out-of-state authority rejects such a defense. Applt's Brief at 43-44. However, 
cases with fact situations similar to those here do recognize the application of the 
ordinary course defense. For instance, in Textron supra, a debtor sold collateral in which 
a secured party claimed a security interest and deposited the cash proceeds of the sale 
into a deposit account. Subsequently, with the consent of the debtor, the depository bank 
applied the funds in the account to an amount the debtor owed the depository bank. The 
court applied Official Comment 2(c) and stated that the depository bank would be 
permitted to retain the proceeds as an ordinary course transferee of money if it had 
received the money in connection with the operation of the debtor's business and without 
knowing or being reckless in knowing that the payment violated the secured party's 
security interest. Textron, 579 N.W.2d. at 52. The Court also rejected the secured 
party's argument that the application of the funds in the deposit account to the debtor's 
obligation constituted a set-off. Id. Instead, the Court stated that "a set-off is the 
involuntary taking of funds from a debtor's account," and there was no evidence that the 
payment to the depository bank was involuntary. Id. 
Similarly, in J.I Case Credit Corp. v. First National Bank, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 
1993), the Seventh Circuit held that a bank with a second lien interest took proceeds from 
the sale of collateral free of the first lienor's security interest under Official Comment 
2(c) because the payments made from the bank account were in the ordinary course, and 
the bank with the second lien did not know and was not reckless in knowing whether the 
payments violated the first lienor's security interest. The Seventh Circuit reached this 
conclusion even though the bank holding the second lien interest knew about the 
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existence of the first lien because there was no evidence that the bank suspected that the 
debtor was violating the terms of the first lienor's security interest. The Seventh Circuit 
also held that a negligence standard was not appropriate to apply to the bank's actions. L 
I. Case Credit 991 F.2d at 1278.23 
Moreover, the Utah Legislature's enactment of Revised Article 9 Section 70A-9a-
332, supports the application of Textron, and J.I. Case Credit in this case. As noted in 
HCC Credit Corp. v. Springs Valley Bank & Trust 712 N.E.2d 952 (Ind. 1999), the most 
recent revisions to Article 9 are simply codification of the broad and liberal interpretation 
of the application of § 9-306(c) and Official Comment 2(c): 
We note that in their most recent revision of Article 9, the American Law 
Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws have proposed that this liberal approach [to apply the ordinary course 
defense broadly] be codified. A new section would be added to Article 9 
providing that 'transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds 
free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in 
collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.' 
[Citation omitted]. Broad protection for transferees helps to ensure that 
security interests in deposit accounts do not impair the free flow of funds.. 
. . Rules concerning recovery of payments traditionally have placed a high 
value on finality. The opportunity to upset a completed transaction, or even 
l
" See also ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Bank of the West 166 F.3d 295, 308 (5tn 
Cir. 1999) (". . . , for purposes of Comment 2(c), a payment is within the "ordinary 
course" if made in the operation of the debtor's business and if the recipient of the 
payment acted in good faith and without knowledge of or recklessness about whether the 
payment violated a third party's security interest."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. State of 
New York, 641 N.Y.S.2d 742, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), a car dealer sold a number of 
vehicles, deposited the cash proceeds into its checking account, and paid the State of New 
York over $400,000 to satisfy an existing sales tax liability. The court held that the 
payments were made in the ordinary course of business applying Comment 2(c), so that 
the State of New York primed a competing secured creditor which had claimed the funds 
as proceeds of its perfected security interest in the car inventory. Id. at 203, 204. 
to place a completed transaction in jeopardy by bringing suit against the 
transferee of funds, should be severely limited. 
Id. at 956 n.6. 
Volvo cites three cases as support for its position: Bank of Brewton v. GMAC, 
811 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ala. 1992); C & H Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Sav. Bank, 449 
N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1989), and GMAC v. Lincoln Nat31 18 S.W.3d 337 (Ky. 2000). 
While these cases decline to apply the ordinary course defense set forth in § 9-306 and 
Official Comment 2 thereto, they do not do so because the ordinary course defense is not 
a valid defense, but because those cases involved a set-off or wrongdoing by the party 
asserting the ordinary course defense. 
For instance, in GMAC, a creditor corporation that had provided floor plan 
financing to an automobile dealer sued the dealer's bank to recover proceeds from the 
sales of vehicles in which the creditor claimed a security interest on the basis that the 
dealer bank had converted those proceeds by applying them to the dealer's account 
overdrafts. On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the creditor's security 
interest in the proceeds from the sale took priority over the dealer bank's set-off rights, 
and thus, the dealer bank was liable to the creditor for conversion. GMAC, 18 S.W.3d at 
339-40. However, in this case, Wells Fargo did not exercise an involuntary set-off of any 
of Volvo's collateral proceeds that were deposited into the Concentration Account. 
Furthermore, although the court in GMAC did discuss the protection afforded by 
§ 9-306(2) and Official Comment 2 thereto, it declined to apply that protection because 
of improper behavior on the part of the bank. Contrary to bank policy, the overdrafts in 
GMAC were reviewed and approved by the chairman of the bank, who also was the 
founder of the entity whose account was overdrawn. Id. at 338. Moreover, there had 
been an ongoing problem with overdrafts and the account had been overdrawn for 38 of 
62 business days during the relevant three month time period. Id. Given these facts, the 
court in GMAC did not grant ordinary course protection to the bank. However, no such 
inappropriate behavior is alleged against Wells Fargo in this case. 
In Brewton, the court ruled in favor of the secured party and against the bank 
because the bank was on specific notice that the debtor was in default of its obligations to 
its secured creditor GMAC because the bank had previously dishonored a total of 
$130,000 in checks that the debtor had made out to GMAC. Brewton, 811 F.Supp. at 
650. Notwithstanding this notice, the bank still accepted proceeds from the debtor that 
were subject to GMAC's security interest. Id. at 651 Accordingly, the court found that 
the protections afforded by § 9-306 would not be extended to the bank Id. at 651. Here, 
Wells Fargo had no notice that Great Basin was in default of its obligations to Volvo. 
The C & H Farm case involved a situation in which a bank routinely covered 
checks in a debtor account that was often overdrawn during a four year period. The bank 
also was on notice that sometimes the proceeds being deposited into the account were 
identifiable proceeds of another parties' collateral. See C_&_H, 449 N.W.2d at 875. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the bank set-off collateral proceeds that had been 
deposited into the debtor account to pay itself for the funds it advanced to cover the 
overdrafts. Id. at 876. The secured creditor sued the bank and the bank argued that its 
actions should be protected by the ordinary course defense. The court in C & H found 
§ 9-306(2) and Official Comment 2 to be instructive, but declined to extend its 
protections to the bank because it had exercised a set-off. IcL at 876-77. The situation is 
different here because Wells Fargo did not go in and seize (or set-off) any of the funds in 
the Concentration Account. Instead, Great Basin voluntarily made a payment to Wells 
Fargo to cover the overdrafts that existed in the Concentration Account. 
Moreover, Volvo's arguments are contrary to sound public policy which favors the 
free flow of credit and recognizes the need for finality in banking transactions. In Harley 
Davidson supra, the First Circuit explained the policy as follows: 
. . . First the courts, using comment 2(c) to U.C.C. § 9-306 to determine 
when they should trace proceeds through a commingled account, have 
limited recovery to circumstances where the behavior of the third party, if 
not fraudulent, has at least seemed highly unfair or improper. . . . If, 
however, courts too readily impose liability upon those who receive funds 
from the debtor's ordinary bank account—if, for example, they define 
"ordinary course" of business too narrowly—then ordinary suppliers, 
sellers of gas, electricity, tables, chairs, etc. might find themselves called 
upon to return ordinary payments (from a commingled account) to a 
debtor's secured creditor, say a financer of inventory. Indeed, we can 
imagine good commercial reasons for not imposing, even upon 
sophisticated suppliers or secondary lenders, who are aware that inventory 
financers often take senior secured interests in "all inventory plus 
proceeds," the complicated burden of contacting these financers to secure 
permission to take payment from a dealer's ordinary commingled bank 
account. [Citations omitted]. These considerations indicate that "ordinary 
course" has a fairly broad meaning; and that a court should restrict the use 
of tracing rules to conduct that, in the commercial context, is rather clearly 
improper. 
Harley Davidson, 897 F.2d at 622 (emphasis added). 
Volvo also asserts that to permit Wells Fargo to pursue an "ordinary course" 
defense would be unfair because it would allow Wells Fargo to "claim special rights 
because of its own failure to investigate Great Basin's condition." Applt's Brief at 44. 
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This argument ignores the very purpose behind Section 9-306(2) and Official Comment 
2(c), which permits transferees of who receive payments in the ordinary course to "take 
free of any claim" of a secured party without doing a UCC search in order to enhance 
finality in business transactions and the free flow of credit. 
5. The Undisputed Facts of This Case Establish the Applicability of 
9-306(2) and Official Comment (2)(c). 
Finally, Volvo argues that Wells Fargo has not established "as a matter of law that 
the ordinary course defense applies on the undisputed facts."24 Applt's Brief at 44. 
Volvo does not specify which facts relating to that analysis are in dispute, only that 
"addressing the issue would require the Court to review the record in detail - when the 
trial court has not yet done so on this issue.55 Applt's Brief at 44-45. However, the 
absence of any allegations by Volvo that the transfer was not in the ordinary course or 
that Wells Fargo knew that the transfer violated Volvo's security interest undermines 
Volvo's assertion. Indeed, as set forth in Rule 56(e), "[w]hen a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response by affidavit or 
otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
-Volvo cites HCC Credit Corp. v. Springs Valley Bank & Trust, 712 N.E.2d 952 (Ind. 
1999), for the proposition that the application of the ordinary course defense creates a 
question of fact. However, HCC Credit Corp. actually states that the determination of 
whether the ordinary course defense is applicable is a "question of law," although 
"sometimes an evaluation of the extent to which payment was routine or the extent of the 
recipient's knowledge will require factual analysis." Id. at 958. While the facts of a case 
must always be applied to the law, if the facts are undisputed, it is appropriate for the 
court to rule as a matter of law that the ordinary course defense applies. Id. at 958-59. 
ZL£ 
The undisputed facts here do establish that the ordinary course defense protects 
Wells Fargo. Whether a transferee of money will be protected by the ordinary course 
defense under § 9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) generally depends on the 
consideration of two factors: (a) was the money received in connection with the 
operation of the debtor's business; and (b) did the transferee receive the money without 
knowing or being reckless in knowing that the payment violated the secured party's 
interest See Textron, 579 N.W.2d at 51; J. I. Case Credit 991 F.2d at 1279. The court 
in Harley-Davidson explained that the ordinary course defense "should have a fairly 
broad meaning" and that courts should "restrict the use of tracing rules to conduct that, in 
the commercial context, is rather clearly improper." 897 F.2d at 622. 
Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the $900,000 wire transfer was paid to 
Wells Fargo in connection with the operation of Great Basin's business. It is undisputed 
that the Great Basin Entities had a cash management system at Wells Fargo where each 
of the Great Basin Entities had its own Treasury Management Account and there was also 
a Controlled Disbursement Account. The checks to pay Great Basin's business expenses 
were drawn on one of these accounts, and the requisite funds to cover those checks were 
transferred into those accounts from the Concentration Account. R. 995-97, 1018-19, 
1283. On December 27 and 28, 2000, there were numerous checks that were drawn 
against the Treasury Management Accounts and the Controlled Disbursement Account 
that were to be paid with funds from the Concentration Account. R. 1218, 1229-30. 
There is also no dispute that the list of the payees on the checks shows that they were for 
Great Basin's business operations, and indeed the vast majonty of the amounts paid went 
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to Volvo Trucks, Associates (Great Basin's other flooring lender) and to make tax 
payments. R. 1229-30. There also was nothing unusual about the total amount of the 
checks that had been presented for payment on December 27th and 28l . Indeed, a review 
of the electronic debits/bank debits in December 2000 bank statement for the 
Concentration Account show that almost on a daily basis hundreds of thousands of 
dollars were being transferred from the Concentration Account to the Treasury 
Management Accounts or the Controlled Disbursement Account to cover payments from 
those account. R. 608-15. Moreover, it would not be out of the ordinary for Wells Fargo 
to permit the checks to be honored when Great Basin specifically promised that funds 
would be transferred into the Concentration Account to cover the overdraft. 
With respect to the second factor, there is no allegation and absolutely no evidence 
that Wells Fargo knew or suspected that the $900,000 wire transfer it received was in 
violation of Volvo's claimed security interest. In fact, Dean Luikart, who monitored the 
Great Basin account for Wells Fargo, specifically testified that he was not aware of any 
claim by any third party in the funds that Great Basin used to cover the overdrafts. R. 
1004-05.25 
Although Volvo makes no factual argument on appeal, Volvo did argue before the 
district court that Wells Fargo "must have known" that is was acting to Volvo's prejudice 
because it was aware of Volvo's security interest and knew that the funds that were 
transferred into the Concentration Account were likely to be proceeds from the sale of 
Great Basin's truck inventory. However, as explained in J.I. Case Credit knowledge of a 
security interest does not mean that the party also has knowledge that the party is 
receiving a payment in violation of that security interest. 991 F.2d at 1278. Nor is such 
knowledge sufficient to establish recklessness on the part of the party receiving the 
payment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment entered by the 
district court in favor of Wells Fargo. 
DATED this l^kay of July, 2006. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
fiK4*>^ 
James S. Jardine 
Scott H. Clark 
Elaine A. Monson 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee, 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE were hand-delivered on the / 4%tyofJuly,2006to: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Stephen P. Horvat 
Heather M. Sneddon 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
DATED this N^lay of July, 2006. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
James S. Jardine 
Scott H. Clark 
Elaine A. Monson 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee, 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
>#n/L&+K_ 
882379v5 
Tabl 
vo Commercial Finance LLC the Amencas v Wells Fargo Bank N A 
Lake City Utah 
L RECREATION OF MR JUDD S EXHIBIT 1 MODIFIED FOR TWO TRANSACTIONS NOT ACCOUNTED FOR USING THE LOWEST INTERMEDIATE BALANCE RUL 
EAT BASIN GMC TRUCKS INC 
lysis of Trust money Wells Fargo Concentration and Great Basin Trucks FSB Activ ty for December 2000 
Descnption 
inning Balance 
rust Money 
Dther 
il Beginning Balance 
isfer from Salt Lake Volvo WFB Account 
rust Money 
}ther 
isfer from Arizona WFB Account 
rust Money 
)ther 
isfer from Southwest WFB Account 
rust Money 
5ther 
sfer from Idaho WFB Account 
aist Money 
Mher 
sfer to Great Basin Trucks FSB Account 
rust Money 
)ther 
sfer from Great Basin Trucks FSB Account 
rust Money 
Mher 
r Receipts and Disbursements 
eceipts 
)isbursements 
ng Balance 
rust Money 
>ther 
12/7/00 
$ 1.031,955 
1 031 955 
125 925 
18 848 
42 751 
2 855 
38 778 
564 834 
(1,209,564) 
$ 616.383 
125 925 
490 458 
12/8/00 
$ 125 925 
490.458 
616 383 
190 450 
16 359 
16 895 
30 668 
87 350 
121 434 
710 
242 521 
(223,578) 
$ 1.099.191 
420 620 
678 571 
12/11/00 
$ 420 620 
678.571 
1 099 191 
158 297 
66 637 
76 596 
3 608 
5 271 
106 937 
(763.207) 
$ 753.332 
578 917 
174 415 
12/12/00 
$ 578 917 
174.415 
753 332 
59 419 
57 771 
37 068 
69 427 
2 046 
110 682 
(457,056) 
$ 632,689 
648 344 
(15 655) 
12/13/00 12/14/00 12/15/00 12/18/00 12/19/00 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES - WELLS FARGO BANK 409-1321417 
$ 632 689 
632 689 
65 313 
113 991 
1 817 
17 242 
(434.743) 
$ 396.309 
632 689 
(236 380) 
$ 
T 
396 309 
396 309 
8 000 
81 734 
13 372 
11406 
318 956 
(232,734) 
597.043 
404 309 
192 734 
$ 
2 
404 309 
192.734 
597 043 
80 656 
27 194 
104 490 
49 928 
1 130 712 
(91) 
613 933 
(333.289) 
2.270.574 
1 639 510 
631 063 
$ 
I 
1 639 510 
631.063 
2 270 574 
156 577 
12 245 
63 433 
33 172 
18 896 
134 787 
(339,909) 
2.349.774 
1 651 755 
698 019 
$ 1 651 755 
698.019 
2 349 774 
39 830 
69 652 
15 438 
31 230 
16 450 
(531,174) 
$ 1.991.200 
1 691 585 
299 615 
12/20/00 
$ 1 691 585 
299,615 
1 991 200 
18 819 
36 632 
1011 385 
(68 961) 
$ 2,989.074 
1 691 585 
1 297 489 
12/21/00 
$ 1 691 585 
1,297.489 44 
2 989 074 
29 098 93 
9 179 81 
1 788 83 
(566 584 35) 
(933 416) 
2 500 00 
(406,641 36) 
$ 1.125.001 
1 125 001 
12/22/00 
$ 1 125 001 
1 125 001 
100 334 
13 321 
(500 000 00) 
653 
(78,035) 
$ 661,274 
725 335 
(64 061) 
12/26/00 
$ 661 274 
661 2"M 
72 406 
(1,014,-35) 
$ (281,056) 
661 2-4 
(942 330) 
12/27/00 
$ (281,056) 
(281 056) 
8 858 
300 000 
354 348 
(1,172,310) 
$ (790,161) 
(790 161) 
12/28/00 
$ (790,161) 
("90 161) 
124 
(38,915) 
$ (828 951) 
(828 951) 
12/29/00 
End g 
Balance 
,
 ;..., I ^ , . 
$ $ (828,951) (53,310) 
(828 Q51) $ (53,310) 
900 000 
$ 900 000 
Transfer 
695 
(125,055) 
$ (53,310) 
(^3 310) 
nning Balance 
rust Money 
ther 
Beginning Balance 
GREAT BASIN COMPANIES - FIRST SECURITY BANK (222-00015-32) 
$ 1 066 584 
1,180 587 
$ 1 066 584 
1,311,271 
1 099 214 
1,011,571 
$ 1 09° 214 
1 130 788 
$ 2 982 181 
32,203 
2 230 002 $ 3 014,385 
sfer From WFB Concentration Account 
rust Money 
ther 
sfer to WF8 Concentration Account 
ciated Foods Truck Payment (Trust Money) 
ston Supply Truck Payment (Trust Money) 
r Receipts and Disbursements 
eceipts 
sbursements 
ig Balance 
1 066 584 
933 416 
(300 000) 
32 630 
300 
(900 000) 
1 882 Q 6 " 
63 132 
(261,717) 
50,904 $ 2,247,171 $ 2.377.856 $ 2,110.786 $ 2,230,002 $ 3,014,385 
lie No 091176 
d 12/10/2003 
